Pace Law Review
Volume 13
Issue 2 Fall 1993

Article 7

September 1993

Regulatory Regionalism in Metropolitan Areas: Voter Resistance
and Reform Persistence
John Kincaid

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr

Recommended Citation
John Kincaid, Regulatory Regionalism in Metropolitan Areas: Voter Resistance and Reform
Persistence, 13 Pace L. Rev. 449 (1993)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol13/iss2/7
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more
information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

Regulatory Regionalism in Metropolitan
Areas: Voter Resistance and Reform
Persistence
John Kincaid*
I. Introduction
"There is no denying," wrote Lord Bryce 100 years ago,
"that the government of cities is the one conspicuous failure of
the United States."' This indictment still rings true for reformers and residents of many large cities, despite more than a century of reform efforts by civic movements, states, and the federal
government.'
Reforms of urban governance have generally followed two
lines of action: (1) internal restructuring of municipal government (e.g., nonpartisan elections and city manager systems) and
(2) external restructuring of municipal boundaries and service
areas (e.g., annexation, consolidation, and regional authorities).
It is to the latter that we turn in this article, arguing that longstanding voter resistance to authoritative metropolitan government, such as a single government formed by multijurisdictional
consolidation, has given rise to greater reform efforts to employ
"top-down" regulatory tools to create more comprehensive metropolitan governance arrangements through such devices as federal or state-mandated transportation planning, environmental
protection, and growth management. A major reform critique today is that the state and federal governments have not suffito compel regional
ciently used their fiscal and regulatory clout
3
problems.
metropolitan-wide
to
solutions
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In most cases, regional land-use management of any potent,
comprehensive nature acceptable to its advocates is unlikely to
spring from local voters in most metropolitan areas; instead, it is
more likely to be established by federal and state legislative action. Land-use management on a metropolitan scale will, in most
cases, require a reversal of the historic pattern of state delegations of land-use powers to local governments.4 A state-mandated regulatory approach to land-use policy, perhaps with federal incentives for such action, would be consistent with the
emergence since the 1960s of "regulatory"'6 or "coercive" 6 federalism; however, state-mandated land-use regulation on a metropolitan scale is vulnerable to voter backlashes. These conclusions
are suggested by historical experiences with various reform approaches to metropolitan regional governance. These approaches
are reviewed below in the context of the following background
on metropolitan differentiation.
II.

Accelerating Metropolitan Differentiation

The existence of 86,692 units of local government in the
United States7 is the principal sociopolitical reality underlying
efforts to consolidate local governments in metropolitan areas.
Although, from 1952 to 1992, the number of county governments
decreased from 3,052 to 3,043, township governments declined
from 17,202 to 16,666, and school districts dropped sharply from
67,355 to 14,556, the number of municipal governments increased by fifteen percent from 16,807 in 1952 to 19,296 in 1992,
and the number of special districts increased by a phenomenal
168 percent from 12,340 to 33,131 during the same period.' Fur(1993); DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS (1993).
4. R. ROBERT LINOWES AND DON T. ALLENSWORTH, THE STATES AND LAND USE CONTROL (1975); Ernest J.T. Loo, Comment, State Land Use Statutes: A Comparative Analysis, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1154 (1977).
PETITIVE WORLD

5. U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, REGULATORY FEDERALISM: POLICY, PROCESS, IMPACT AND REFORM 1-54 (1984).

6. John Kincaid, From Cooperation to Coercion in American Federalism:Housing,
Fragmentation and Preemption, 1780-1992, 9 J. L. & POL. 333 (1993) [hereinafter Kincaid, Housing, Fragmentationand Preemption]; John Kincaid, From Cooperative to Coercive Federalism, 509 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 139 (1990).
7. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PRELIMINARY REPORT: 1992 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS (GC92-1(P), 1992).
8. Id. at 3.
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thermore, most of the decreases in units of local government occurred in rural areas, while most of the increases occurred in urban metropolitan areas. Hence, metropolitan areas are becoming
more, not less, differentiated governmentally. For example, the
six-county Chicago region, "referred to by the local media as
'Chicagoland,' has.., more than 1,200 jurisdictions with authority to levy property taxes."' Illinois has the largest number of
local governments (6,810); Pennsylvania has the next largest
number (5,397). New York, with 3,319 local governments, is in
ninth place among the fifty states. Hawaii, with twenty-one, has
the smallest number of local governments.1 0 There is even more
differentiation than is revealed by these data. Not included in
the Census data are more than 130,000 residential community
associations (RCAs), which are, in effect, private government
communities governed by restrictive deed covenants, financed
by mandatory dues assessments, and ranging in size from a few
households to communities of as many as 68,000 people, such as
Reston, Virginia, and Columbia, Maryland. Nearly twelve percent of the nation's population live in RCAs." Although these
non-municipal communities have limited powers, they engage in
land-use management and public service provision, and they are
located mostly in metropolitan areas. Given the private property
rights, including private streets and roads, attached to these
communities, plus the voting power of RCA residents in general
local, state, and federal elections, RCAs can pose additional barriers
to
comprehensive
metropolitan
integration
and
coordination.
The trend toward metropolitan differentiation became evident soon after World War II, when federal and state housing,
transportation, tax, and land-use policies aided low-density
suburbanization around old high-density cities as well as low-density urbanization in the so-called Sunbelt.1 2 Seeking sun,

9. Robert W. Rafuse, Jr., Fiscal Disparities in Chicagoland, INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PERSP., Summer 1991, at 14.

10.

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,

11. U.S.

supra note 7, at 4.

ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, RESIDENTIAL COMMU-

NITY ASSOCIATIONS: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL

SYSTEM?

3-4

(1989).
12. DENNIS R. JUDD, THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN CITIES: PRIVATE POWER AND PUBLIC
POLICY 257-372 (2d ed. 1984); THE RISE OF THE SUNBELT CITIES (David C. Perry & Alfred
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space, savings, and satisfaction, millions of Americans took advantage of improved highways and of housing programs operated by the Federal Housing Administration' 3 and the Veterans'
Administration 4 to abandon inner city "neighborhoods to settle
somewhere in the commuter belt."' 5 As early as 1950, "less than
half the population of forty metropolitan areas lived downtown,
and in over three-fifths of metropolitan United States the growing suburbs showed a greater numerical increase as well as a
higher percentage growth than the central city."' 6
In the face of these policies and developments, many urban
reformers began to advocate forms of metropolitan government.' 7 To facilitate public acceptance of reform, the massive
suburbanization that followed World War II was usually described in negative terms, such as "fragmentation" and "urban
sprawl," not in more neutral terms, such as "differentiation,"
"diversity," or "multiplicity." These negative labels were accompanied by hostility on the part of many intellectuals to the suburban way of life.'" In turn, small suburban municipalities were
often labeled as "toy" or "peanut" governments.
At the same time, advocates of metropolitan government
pointed to the deterioration of central-city economic bases, particularly in the Snowbelt, and to the growing concentration of
poor and minority populations in many central cities. These developments, coupled with the emergence of metropolitan interdependence (aptly symbolized by city-suburb commuting)
seemed to strengthen the case for metropolitan consolidation.
Central cities, it was argued, needed to capture the human resources and tax bases of their surrounding suburbs in order to
revitalize themselves. In addition, legislative reapportionment
mandated by the U.S. Supreme Court 9 had shattered the politi-

J. Watkins eds., 1977).
13. Authorized by the National Housing Act, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934).
14. Serviceman's Readjustment Act, ch. 268, § 501, 58 Stat. 284, 292 (1944).
15. FREDERICK M. WIRT ET AL., ON THE CITY'S RIM: POLITICS AND POLICY IN SUBURBIA
20 (1972).
16. ROBERT C. WOOD, SUBURBIA: ITS PEOPLE AND THEIR POLITICS 62-63 (1958).
17. E.g., LUTHER HALSEY GULICK, THE METROPOLITAN PROBLEM AND AMERICAN IDEAS
(1966).
18. E.g., JOHN KEATS, THE CRACK IN THE PICTURE WINDOW (1956).
19. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586-87 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376
U.S. 1, 6-7 (1964).
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cal bases of big-city political machines, reduced the political bases of rural political bosses, and enhanced the representation of
suburbs in state legislatures. Then, the emergence of environmental protection as a public value in the 1970s added another
rationale for metropolitan government. The idea that the suburban "growth juggernaut"2 entails horrendous environmental
costs is now an integral element of the regional reform critique
of "urban sprawl."
III.

Obstacles to Consolidation

Advocates of such reform have encountered numerous obstacles, however-barriers rooted ultimately in American history
and culture. For one, never in the history of the United States
has more than a third of the American people lived in urban
places having populations of 100,000 or more.2 ' As Figure 1 indicates, the high point of big-city life in American history occurred
in 1930 when thirty percent of Americans lived in urban places
having 100,000 or more residents.2 2 Thus, even though the
United States is overwhelmingly urban, it is not a nation of cities in the classical European sense;2 3 it is a nation of small and
medium-size communities, most of which place a high value on
self-government. More than seventy-five percent of America's
municipalities have less than 5,000 residents. Prior to the 1930s,
these communities were dispersed on the nation's vast rural
frontier; since the 1930s, these communities have become more
concentrated in metropolitan areas, but nevertheless still dispersed along the crabgrass frontier outside of big cities.
Second, metropolitan consolidation runs against the grain of
the agrarian tradition in American life and evokes the ambivalence, sometimes hostility, that many Americans harbor toward
large cities.14 Echoes of Thomas Jefferson's opinion of city life
still resonate for many Americans: "I view great cities as pesti20.

PEIRCE, supra note 3, at 28.
21. Calculated from BUREAU OF

THE CENSUS,

U.S.

STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO

DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL

1970, Part 1,

Series

(1975).
22. Id.
23. Daniel J. Elazar, Are We A Nation of Cities? in A NATION OF
AMERICA'S URBAN PROBLEMS

24.

A 57-72, 11-12

CITIES: ESSAYS ON

89, 106-09 (Robert A. Goldwin ed., 1968).

MORTON WHITE AND LUCIA WHITE, THE INTELLECTUAL VERSUS THE CITY

(1962).
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lential to the morals, the health and the liberties of man.''1 5
Public opinion polls since the 1950s have regularly shown that
most Americans prefer to live in suburbs, small towns, and rural
areas rather than in cities. Like their patterns of urban settlement, Americans tend to desire the urban amenities available in
suburbs, while rejecting city life in its classic, cosmopolitan
sense.
Third, suburbanization has been a long-emerging phenomenon, beginning in the Northeast in the nineteenth century when
affluent urbanites sought to escape what they regarded as the
deleterious conditions of cities created by industrialization, immigration, and political corruption. Later, the construction of
streetcar lines made suburban living accessible to less affluent
middle-class residents.2" Thus, suburbanization for many Americans became associated not only with country living but also
with upward mobility. Consequently, when post-World War II
economic growth, public policies, and assembly-line housing construction made suburbs accessible even to lower middle-class
families, 7 suburbanization quickly emerged as the dominant
and most preferred pattern of human settlement in the United
States. Although Lewis Mumford labeled Levittown, Long Island, "an instant slum" littered with a "multitude of uniform,
unidentifiable houses, lined up inflexibly, at uniform distances,
on uniform roads, in a treeless communal waste," the Levitts
built and sold more than 17,000 homes there between 1947 and
1951, "along with seven village greens and shopping centers,
fourteen playgrounds,
nine swimming pools, two bowling alleys,
2' 8
and a town hall."

Fourth, for better or worse, suburbanization reflects the
human tendency to differentiate communities along economic,
racial, ethnic, religious, and other social lines. Although contemporary suburbanization is often attributed to racism, this is only
25. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Doctor Benjamin Rush (Sept. 23, 1800), in 9
THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON

26.

SAM

B. WARNER,

146, 147 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1905).

JR., STREETCAR SUBURBS: THE PROCESS OF GROWTH IN BOSTON,

1870-1900, at 34 (1962).
27. E.g., HERBERT J. GANS, THE LEVITTOWNERS: How PEOPLE LIVE AND POLITIC IN
SUBURBIA

(1967).

28. Alexander 0. Boulton, The Buy of the Century, AM.
at 62.
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partly true. The origins of suburbanization predate the massive
migration of African Americans and other people of color into
northern cities. Historically, suburbanization has usually appealed to upwardly mobile urbanites, including members of inner city ethnic groups (e.g., the lace-curtain Irish) who moved
away from their poorer cousins. As Samuel Lubell noted:
To map the growth of almost any of our larger cities since the
turn of the century is to map [an] upward, outward push of the
masses toward the greener suburbs, propelling the older residents
before them. And the story of the Democratic party in the big
cities is really the story of the social and political revolution
which marched along with this exodus from the slums."9
Lubell predicted that many African Americans, still moving into
northern cities in large numbers during the 1950s, would also
follow "the old tenement trail" out to the suburbs.30 Indeed, African American migration to the suburbs has increased significantly, with, for example, as many as 75,000 African Americans
moving from the city of Los Angeles to surrounding suburbs
during the 1980s. 1 In addition, low-cost land, among other factors, rather than white flight has been a salient factor in Sunbelt
suburbanization. Suburbanization did not become massive nationwide until it became affordable and accessible to most
Americans after the Second World War.
In some respects, suburban differentiation has reproduced
the neighborhood differentiation long found in central cities:
rich and poor; black, brown, and white; Protestant, Catholic, and
Jewish; Irish, Italian, Polish, Russian, Puerto Rican, and so on.
However, neighborhood differentiation within central cities is
still often drawn more sharply along such lines than is suburban
differentiation. Within most central cities, even one portion of a
city, such as Manhattan, neighborhoods range from the wretchedly poor to enormously rich. Religious and ethnic distinctions
between many suburbs have been reduced significantly compared to continuing central-city neighborhood distinctions, thus
leaving class and race as the two predominant patterns of subur-

29.

SAMUEL LUBELL, THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS

64 (2d ed. 1956).

30. Id. at 96-97.
31. Miles Corwin, L.A.'s Loss: "Black Flight", L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1992, at 26A.
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ban differentiation. 2 In central cities, neighborhood turf is defended by civic associations, ward politicians, and gangs. In the
suburbs, neighborhood turf is defended, in effect, by municipalizing neighborhoods, that is, preserving or creating small and
medium-size local governments. Yet, the suburbs may prove to
be hotter melting pots than central cities. Indeed, perceptions of
a drab sameness and homogeneity, compared to the diversity of
central-city life, have long been a staple of social criticism of
suburbia.
Even race and class lines are beginning to blur in the suburbs because affordability and accessibility have increasingly diversified suburbs along economic and racial lines.33 Although income differences between central cities and suburbs are
commonly noted in the literature, the reality is often more complex. For example, while 16.9 percent of Washington, D.C.'s residents live below the poverty line compared to a range of only 3.1
percent to 7.1 percent in the surrounding suburban counties,
sixty-one percent of the poor people in the metropolitan area
live in the suburbs.
As more lower income persons and minority groups move
into suburbs, moreover, they may be no less resistant to metropolitan government than their white and more affluent predecessors. Furthermore, minority groups that constitute majorities or
powerful voting blocs in central cities have not been eager to see
their voting power diluted by city-suburb consolidation, an issue
now made more salient and complex by rules against minority
vote dilution under the U.S. Voting Rights Act. 4 For example,

32. See generally BENNETT M. BERGER, WORKING-CLASS SUBURB: A STUDY OF AUTO
(1960); WILLIAM M. DOBRINER, CLASS IN SUBURBIA (1963); RUSK,
supra note 3.
33. Mark Schneider and John R. Logan, Fiscal Implications of Class Segregation:
Inequalities in the Distributionof Public Goods and Services in Suburban Municipalities, 17 URB. AFF. Q. 23 (1981).
34. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965), amended by
Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968); Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (1970); Pub. L.
No. 91-405, 84 Stat. 845 (1970); Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400 (1975); Pub. L. No. 97205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982); Pub. L. No. 102-344, 106 Stat. 921 (1992); see also, Binny
Miller, Who Shall Rule and Govern? Local Legislative Delegations,Racial Politics, and
the Voting Rights Act, 102 YALE L. J. 105, 131-37 (1992), a case study of white efforts to
consolidate the city of Augusta and Richmond County, Georgia, in order to defeat black
majority power in Augusta. Voters approved the consolidation, but it was vetoed by the
U.S. Department of Justice.
WORKERS IN SUBURBIA
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white Republican Richard Riordan, who won Los Angeles's 1993
mayoral election, received overwhelming support from the city's
in-town suburb, San Fernando Valley, which accounted for
forty-four percent of the city's vote. Only thirty-seven percent of
the city's residents are white Anglos. 5
Historically, moreover, separations of central cities from
suburbs were sometimes initiated by central-city residents. Beginning in the 1840s, for example, residents of the City of St.
Louis, Missouri, agitated for a separation of the city from the
county largely because city residents objected to paying county
taxes on top of city taxes to support services for residents of the
sparsely populated county. After Missouri made home rule available in 1875, city voters approved a separation of St. Louis city
from St. Louis county in 1876.36 Non-city voters opposed the
separation by three to one. In later years, as the number of suburban municipalities increased in the county from nine in 1910
to ninety-eight by 1959, majorities of suburban county residents
voted against proposals to reunite the city and county. Similarly,
voters have usually resisted municipal consolidations within the
37
suburban St. Louis county.
For these and other particularistic reasons, attempts to use
various tools, such as annexation and city-county consolidation,
to establish metropolitan governments or otherwise consolidate
central cities and suburbs have not been very successful, especially since World War I. However, to argue that resistance to
metropolitan government is merely a function of race and class
is too simple. As the St. Louis example suggests, voters are motivated by considerations of self-interest and local self-government that may or may not be related to race or class interests.
Consolidations of suburban municipalities themselves are often
resisted as strenuously as consolidations of central cities and
suburbs.

35. John 0. Calmore, Metropolitan America and Racism, 2 POVERTY & RACE 9
(1993).
36. Home rule is defined as a "[clonstitutional provision or type of legislative action
which results in providing local cities and towns with a measure of self government if

such local government accepts terms of the state legislation."
660 (5th ed. 1979).
37. U.S. ADVISORY

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, METROPOLITAN OR-

GANIZATION: THE ST. Louis CASE

15-17 (1988).
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Metropolitan Consolidation

A number of devices are available, and have been used, to
effect forms of metropolitan-wide government. These include
annexation, city-county consolidation, metropolitan federation,
transfers of functions, boundary review commissions, and regional councils. In the face of massive suburbanization and metropolitan differentiation, however, use of these devices has met
with limited success.
A.

Annexation

Annexation was widely used in the nineteenth century to increase the territorial size of cities as immigration and industrialization swelled urban areas. The emergence of large and successful industrial combines also provided a model for good city
government in the late nineteenth century when bigger was
widely regarded as better. Many cities competed with each other
to become bigger and also to rival the great cities of Europe. In
addition, communities adjacent to cities sometimes sought annexation in order to obtain city services.38 City politicians also
had an interest in capturing resources, especially voters, because
most city political organizations (i.e., machines) were countybased party organizations. Given that legislative and congressional apportionments were largely drawn along county lines
prior to 1964,11 the roots of political power lay in county party
organizations, thus giving city politicians incentives to capture
populated inner suburbs along their borders.
However, the spreading of the home-rule movement, which
began in Missouri in 1875, coupled with rural and, later, suburban reactions against city growth, slowed annexation by the turn
of the century. The principles associated with home rule had two
significant dampening effects on annexation. First, home-rule
principles limited state legislative interference in municipal affairs, thereby restraining unilateral legislative consolidations of
jurisdictions. Second, home-rule principles increased the ability
38.

JON

C.

TEAFORD, CITY AND SUBURB: THE POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION OF METRO-

1850-1970, at 32-63 (1979).
39. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586-87 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376
U.S. 1, 6-7 (1964).
POLITAN AMERICA.
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of rural and suburban local governments to defend their territories against annexation or consolidation.
Of the forty-four states that authorize municipal annexation
of unincorporated territory by general law, thirty-four allow annexation to be initiated by petition of a percentage of the property owners living in the area to be annexed; thirty-two allow
annexation procedures to be initiated by a municipal ordinance
or resolution; twenty-seven require at least a public hearing;
fourteen require majority approval of the proposed annexation
in a referendum in the annexing city; nineteen require majority
approval of the proposed annexation in a referendum in the territory to be annexed; and eleven require approval of the county
governing authority. In a number of states, however, especially
in the Northeast, the authority to annex is moot because the entire territory of the state is already incorporated (e.g., New
Jersey). Of the forty-two states that authorize consolidations of
cities, two states (South Dakota and Wyoming) require majority
approval in a referendum in only one city; thirty-four states require majority approval in a referendum in each city to be consolidated; and six states require no referendum, although they
may impose other requirements, such as judicial review. "
Although many state legislatures retain authority to annex
jurisdictions unilaterally by special acts, this authority is rarely
used to effect municipal annexations. Instead, to the extent that
it has been employed, this authority has been used to consolidate counties, townships, and school districts, mostly in rural areas experiencing population losses, not in metropolitan areas experiencing "sprawl."
Municipal authority to engage in annexation varies among
and, sometimes, within states. Liberal annexation powers can be
found in Idaho, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and
Texas where certain municipalities can engage in unilateral annexations, usually over adjacent, unincorporated communities.
The power to annex, however, is not always utilized by cities. In
Texas, for example, Houston used its annexation powers aggressively, while Dallas and Ft. Worth did not follow suit. Operating
under the same state rules, citizens and politicians in Houston
40. U.S.

ADVISORY

COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL

RELATIONS, STATE LAWS Gov-

ERNING LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION

24-25 (1993).
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and Dallas/Ft. Worth chose to organize their systems of metropolitan governments quite differently.4 1 Houston's aggressive annexation, however, has had little benefit for comprehensive landuse management because the city still has no zoning ordinance.
Voters rejected zoning in 1948, 1962, and again in 1993.4'
In Georgia, South Dakota, and Wisconsin, municipalities
may initiate annexation, but voters in the territory to be annexed must accept or reject the annexation. In Indiana and Tennessee, residents of a territory to be annexed have a right to seek
judicial review to block annexation, while in Kentucky and Virginia, 43 state courts approve or disapprove proposed annexations. In Alaska, California, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Oregon,
and Washington, a boundary review commission plays a more or
less important role in determining annexations. 4 '
Given the distribution of the states cited above, it is evident
that there is a mismatch between liberal powers of municipal
annexation and the perceived need for annexation as a tool for
incrementally achieving more areawide governance. Rather than
being available to the metropolitan areas widely regarded as
most in need of consolidation, especially in the greater Northeast, more liberal annexation powers tend to be found in (1)
states with substantial rural, unincorporated territory; (2) southern states more accustomed at least to areawide county governance; and (3) to some extent, states having a moralistic or progressive political culture' 5 receptive to metropolitan reform
ideas. Given that voters are not likely to relinquish their power
to vote on annexations and that state legislatures are not likely
to override these local preferences, annexation is not available to
41. Robert D. Thomas and Suphapong Boonyapratuang, Local Government Complexity: Consequences for County Property-Tax and Debt Policies, 23 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 1 (1993).
42. R. A. Dyer, Zoning Defeated By Narrow Margin, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 3, 1993, at
Al; Roger K. Lewis, Land-Use Rules Are Key In Houston Zoning Plan, WASH. POST,
June 5, 1993, at E13.
43. JACK D. EDWARDS, NEIGHBORS AND SOMETIMES FRIENDS: MUNICIPAL ANNEXATION
IN MODERN VIRGINIA 15 (1992).
44. U.S. ADVISORY

COMM'N ON

INTERGOVERNMENTAL

RELATIONS, LOCAL BOUNDARY

COMMISSIONS: STATUS AND ROLES IN FORMING, ADJUSTING AND DISSOLVING LocAL GOVERN-

10-11 (1992).
45. See generally DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE
STATES 112-142 (3d ed. 1984); POLITICAL CULTURE, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE AMERICAN
STATES (John Kincaid ed., 1982).

MENT BOUNDARIES
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address the problems customarily associated with most big
cities.
B.

City-County Consolidation

During the nineteenth century and early twentieth century,
city-county consolidations produced seven of today's great central cities: Boston, Denver, Honolulu, New Orleans, New York,
Philadelphia, and San Francisco. As Table 1 indicates, however,
city-county consolidations came to a halt in 1907 and did not
resume until 1947, forty years later. Furthermore, after 1947,
state legislatures virtually ceased enacting city-county consolidations unilaterally. Since 1947, only the 1969 "Unigov" consolidation of Indianapolis and Marion County was effected by special
state legislation unaccompanied by local voter approval. However, this consolidation was limited rather than comprehensive.
"Unigov, can best be described as a partially overlapping series
cities [rather] than
of special districts with interior independent
46
government."
consolidated
completely
a
as
Only about fourteen states explicitly allow city-county consolidations: California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Minnesota,
Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South
Carolina, Utah, Virginia, and Washington. Of these states, Georgia, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, Ohio, and Oregon require majority approval in a referendum in each city to be affected by the consolidation. Florida, Georgia, Montana, North
Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, and Washington require mareferendum
jority approval of the consolidation in a county-wide
47
alone or in addition to referenda in each city.
Despite the availability of legal authorization for citycounty consolidation in fourteen states today, and more so in the
past, consolidation has not been used widely and has rarely been
used to address big-city problems. Furthermore, the number of
states authorizing city-county consolidation has decreased in recent decades.

46. JOHN L. MIKESELL, CITY
47. U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N

FINANCES, CITY FUTURES
ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL

24 (1993).
RELATIONS, STATE LAWS Gov-

ERNING LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION,

supra note 40.
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There have been only twenty-seven city-county consolida48
tions from 1805-1977.
City-county consolidations account for 0.9 percent of the nation's counties and 0.1 percent of the nation's
municipalities. 9
Of eighty-three city-county consolidation referendums held
from 1921 to 1979, only seventeen (twenty percent) were approved by voters.50
No county having a population of 500,000 or more residents
5
has ever gained the approval of its voters for consolidation. 1
Most city-county consolidations, at the time of consolidation,
involved counties having populations of less than 100,000
residents. 2
Most city-county consolidations (approximately eighty-two
percent) have occurred in the South and West, not in the
more densely populated and jurisdictionally diverse metropolitan areas of the Northeast and Midwest.5"
Not all consolidations are comprehensive; instead, some entail the establishment of service districts involving different
mechanisms of integration of the personnel and structures of
the city and county governments."

Thus, like annexation, city-county consolidation is not realistically available as a mechanism for metropolitan governmental integration, nor are voters likely to relinquish their right to
vote on consolidations and, thereby, their tendency to vote
against city-county consolidations. Furthermore, New York City,
one of the early models for consolidation, is now facing agitation
for secession from Staten Island. Voters in Staten Island voted
in favor of secession in November 1993. 5
48. U.S.

ADVISORY

COMM'N

ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL

RELATIONS, STATE AND

LOcAL

ROLES IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 396 (1982).

49. These figures represent the proportion of city-county consolidations to the number of counties and municipalities, respectively, that existed in 1992. See text accompanying note 8.

50. Id. at 397.
51. Id.

52. Id.
53. Id. at 396.
54. Id. at 400-01.
55. William Bunch, Staten Island Wants Its Own Way, NEWSDAY, Nov. 3, 1993, at
18E; James Dao, Secession is Approved; Next Move is Albany's, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3,
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C.

Metropolitan Federation

Another approach to regional governance is metropolitan
federation, a somewhat broad term covering relationships between local governments and a regional government having certain metropolitan powers. This approach to metropolitan governance, often called a two-level system, 56 attempts to
institutionalize the principle of fiscal equivalence by assigning to
a regional government functions appropriate for areawide performance while leaving to local governments functions appropriate to smaller jurisdictions.5
Toronto, Canada, is the premier example of a metropolitan
federation, consisting of six local governments and the areawide
Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto. This federation was instituted by the Parliament of Ontario in 1953 upon the recommendation of the Municipal Board of Ontario, a boundary review body, after the board was pressured to reject Toronto's
application to annex surrounding municipalities. The federation's boundaries have not kept pace with population growth,
however. Metropolitan Toronto's share of the population of the
greater Toronto area dropped from seventy-seven percent in

1961 to fifty-four percent in

1991.58

A limited two-tier system was authorized by Michigan in
1990."' The statute permits a group of cities having a combined
population of less than one million to establish a metropolitan
council, which may levy 0.5 mills 0 on the value of taxable real
and personal property within its jurisdiction and/or require each
member city to pay 0.2 mills for operating costs. To create a
council, five percent or more of the registered voters in the proposed council's jurisdiction must sign a petition, and a majority

1993, at B4.
56. RESEARCH

AND POLICY COMM., COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEV., RESHAPING Gov-

ERNMENT IN METROPOLITAN AREAS

57. U.S.

19-20, 44-46 (1970).

ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL

OF LoCAL GOVERNMENTAL REORGANIZATION

RELATIONS,

III

THE CHALLENGE

4-27 (1974).

58. Frances Frisken, Planning and Servicing the Greater Toronto Area: The Interplay of Provincial and Municipal Interests, in METROPOLITAN GOVERNANCE: AMERICAN/
CANADIAN

INTERGOVERNMENTAL PERSPECTIVES

157 (Donald N. Rothblatt and Andrew

Sanction eds., 1993).
59. 1989 Mich. Pub. Acts 292.

60. A mill is "one-tenth of one cent."

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol13/iss2/7
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of voters in the jurisdiction must approve the council in a referendum. The functions that may be performed by a metropolitan
council include land and water use and development, economic
development and planning, solid waste collection, recycling,
water and sewerage services, transportation, recreation, and
some support for public institutions of higher education. To
date, only the Grand Rapids metropolitan area has established a
council.
Another type of federated arrangement is the "comprehensive urban county,"'" of which Miami-Dade County, first formed
in 1957 to embrace twenty-six municipalities and made more
comprehensive in 1973, is the principal example. This approach
allocates to the county responsibilities for a wide range of municipal functions for incorporated and unincorporated areas.
The comprehensive urban county may be created by voter approval in a referendum, state legislation, county charter provisions, transfers of functions to the county government, or all of
these procedures. Under this arrangement, municipalities within
the county retain their independent corporate status. Such an
arrangement is not truly metropolitan, however, because the territorial limits of the overarching government are the county's
boundaries. This approach has met with little acceptance across
the nation, although in some states, such as California, Maryland, and New York, some counties have gradually acquired sufficient municipal powers to become de facto comprehensive urban counties.
Miami-Dade, moreover, has not been an unqualified success,
as evidenced by Miami's increased social problems and by the
devastating impact of Hurricane Andrew in 1992. Significant
factors in the destruction caused by Hurricane Andrew were lax
building codes and code inspections. Building codes requiring
structures to withstand 150 mile-per-hour hurricane-force winds
would have substantially reduced home destruction. Yet, since
its establishment in 1957, the Metro Dade Commission, which
has building code jurisdiction over all municipalities in the
county, steadily weakened what had been one of the strongest
hurricane codes in the nation. The commission also compro-

61. U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, III THE CHALLENGE
OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 57, at 96.
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mised on building code inspection rules and practices.2
A third variation of the federated approach is a metropolitan or regional multi-purpose service district." In this case, local
governments create a special district to provide multiple services
or exercise various powers across a metropolitan area. The governing body of the district is ordinarily appointed by its constituent local government bodies. However, even where state legislation has authorized local governments to create such districts
(e.g., California, Colorado, Oregon, and Washington), few multipurpose districts have been created, and those brought into existence have generally not exercised the full range of their authorized functions. Although there are many single-purpose districts
that perform metropolitan functions in the United States, only
8.1 percent (2,674) of the nation's 33,131 special district governments perform more than one function. 4
D.

Transfers of Functions

Limited forms of metropolitan or sub-metropolitan governance and service provision can be accomplished through transfers of functions, especially from local governments to a larger
entity. Some eighteen states provide constitutional or statutory
authorization for voluntary transfers of functions from one government to another: Alaska, California, Connecticut, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Michigan, Montana, New York, North
Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia." Only half of these states
(Alaska, California, Hawaii, Illinois, Michigan, Montana, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia) allow functional transfers
without voter approval.
Transfers of functions are not the same as inter-local service
agreements. Transfers ordinarily shift a function or power per62. Lisa Getter, Building Code Eroded Over Years: Watered-Down Rules Meant
Weaker Homes, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 11, 1992 at IA; Luis Feldstein Soto and Lisa Getter,
Panels Faulted Dade's Building Inspections, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 13, 1992, at 1A.
63. U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, III CHALLENGE OF LoCAL GOVERNMENT, supra note 57, at 97.
64. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 7, at 3.
65. U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, INTERGOVERNMENTAL
SERVICE ARRANGEMENTS FOR DELIVERING LOCAL PUBLIC SERVICES: UPDATE 1983, at 18-19
(1985).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol13/iss2/7
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manently from one government to another. A transfer also shifts
political, policy, and fiscal authority, as well as operational responsibility, from one government to another.
Although data on transfers are not available, it appears unlikely that voluntary transfers of functions to metropolitan-wide
entities, including counties, are a viable option for significantly
advancing local governmental reorganization or metropolitan
land-use management. For city-counties, such as New York City
and Philadelphia, there is no larger county to which functions
can be transferred. For central cities located within larger counties, county voters and officials are likely to resist transfers of
functions that would significantly increase county fiscal burdens
or reduce important local municipal powers. More likely are
transfers of selected functions to single-purpose, area-wide special districts and to state government itself. Otherwise, local governments are more likely to make use of inter-local service
agreements, which are authorized by general law or the constitution in forty-two states."
E. Boundary Review Commissions
In still another, albeit limited, approach to metropolitan
governance, twelve states have created either statewide or substate boundary review commissions (BRCs): Alaska (1959), California (1963), Iowa (1968, 1972), Michigan (1972), Minnesota
(1959), Missouri (1989), Nevada (1967), New Mexico (1965), Oregon (1969), Utah (1979), Virginia (1980), and Washington
(1967). Only six of the BRCs are statewide; the other six are limited to one (e.g., St. Louis County, Missouri) or several (e.g., Eugene, Portland, and Salem, Oregon, although the Salem BRC
was abolished in 1980) metropolitan areas. Three of the BRCs
(Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah) may consider only annexations. Eleven of the BRCs may approve or disapprove boundarychange proposals, subject to judicial appeal or popular referendum. Virginia's BRC is only advisory.6

66. U.S.

ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL

RELATIONS, STATE LAWS Gov-

ERNING LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION,

67. U.S.

ADVISORY

COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL

supra note 40, at 26-27.

RELATIONS, LOCAL BOUNDARY

COMMISSIONS: STATUS AND ROLES IN FORMING, ADJUSTING AND DISSOLVING LOCAL GOVERN-

MENT BOUNDARIES, supra note

44, at 21.
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The objectives of these commissions, as set forth in their
enabling laws, have generally been to (1) encourage orderly metropolitan development and discourage "sprawl"; (2) promote
comprehensive, area-wide land-use planning; (3) enhance the
quality and quantity of public services; (4) limit inter-local competition; and (5) help ensure the fiscal viability of local governments, in part by discouraging the creation of "peanut" governments. These are classic objectives of metropolitan reform,
objectives that were prevalent during the decade (1959-1969)
when eight of the twelve BRCs were created; however, in a recent study by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, the BRCs were unable to provide empirical
evidence of meeting these objectives. 8 Critics have charged that
BRCs are (1) undemocratic, especially insofar as they prevent
municipal incorporation desired by residents of unincorporated
communities; (2) biased toward promoting bigger government;
and (3) oligopolistic insofar as existing local governments may
use a BRC to resist competition from new entrants into the local
government marketplace. However, just as it is difficult to verify
BRC successes, it is also difficult to verify these criticisms." Essentially, local officials and citizens have tamed most of the
BRCs so that they perform useful but largely unobtrusive functions. This primarily includes: (1) studying proposed boundary
changes in order to provide information to local officials and residents, and (2) engaging in mediation and dispute resolution
over proposed boundary changes.70
F. Regional Councils
The most widespread effort to create forms of metropolitan
governance has been the movement to create regional councils of
governments and areawide planning commissions. These councils serve multiple jurisdictions, but are not formal governments
because they do not possess independent political authority and
taxing power. Generally, there are two types of regional councils:
(1) general-purpose councils, which engage in planning, coordination, information dissemination, and policy formulation in va68. Id. at 29-31.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 25.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol13/iss2/7
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rious policy fields; and (2) special-purpose councils, which carry
out one program or policy responsibility for multiple jurisdictions (e.g., regional health planning and coordination). Generalpurpose councils are created by state and/or local governments
and are usually governed by the council's constituent local governments. Special-purpose councils are most often created in response to federal government mandates, and are often governed
by appointed non-governmental representatives of the people
served by the councils rather than by local governments per se.
In 1977, there were 675 general-purpose councils and 1,257 special-purpose councils employing, together, about 148,000 persons
and spending some $1.3 billion." About forty-three states had
systems of regional councils that covered the state, and nineteen
states authorized the establishment of regional councils across
state lines.
The movement to create regional councils gained significant
momentum during the late 1950s, and then accelerated during
the 1960s and 1970s due largely to incentives and requirements
promulgated by the federal government. The first important
federal action was the enactment of section 701 of the Housing
Act of 1954,72 which provided fifty-fifty matching grants for urban area planning by regional, metropolitan, or state agencies.
Section 701 was soon broadened by the Housing Act of 195973 to
substitute "comprehensive" for "urban" planning, to require
planning to encompass entire urban areas having common or related problems, to make more areas eligible for federal funds,
and to require intergovernmentally coordinated planning. 7
These enactments were then followed, for example, by federal
incentives and requirements for metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs) and regional conservation and development districts in 1961; 7 1 economic development districts in 1968;76 crimi-

71. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS
(1977).
72. Housing Act of 1954, ch. 649, § 701, 68 Stat. 590, 640 (1954).
73. Housing Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-372, § 419, 73 Stat. 654, 678-679 (1959).
74. U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, REGIONAL DECISION
MAKING: NEW STRATEGIES FOR SUBSTATE DISTRICTS 57 (1973).
75. Housing Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-70, § 310, 75 Stat. 149, 170-71 (1961).
76. Housing and Urban Development Act, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476 (1968).
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nal justice coordination councils in 1970; 77 area-wide agencies on
aging in 1973; 71 health systems agencies in 1975;7 ' and air quality control regions in 1977.0 In turn, many states established
and supported state-wide systems of substate regional councils.
Consequently, the number of general-purpose regional councils
increased from about 39 in 1954, to 585 in 1970, and to 675 in
1977, then dropped to 632 in 1980.81
The election of Ronald Reagan to the presidency in 1980,
however, brought a sharp reversal of federal policy toward regionalism. In 1981, the administration
'decommissioned' the eight active and three still-born economic
development regions established at the request of the governors
under Title V of the Public Works and Economic Development
Act of 1965. The administration also closed down the six federalstate river basin commissions that had been established under Title II of the Water Resources Planning Act of 1965.82
In 1982, President Reagan rescinded the Office of Management
and Budget's Circular A-95, which had been promulgated pursuant to the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968.83 Circular
A-95 promoted regional and metropolitan coordination by requiring regional and state reviews and comments on most federal grant applications prepared by local governments. The circular was replaced by Executive Order 12372, which "left
virtually all procedural and implementation issues up to the dis'
cretion of the individual states."84
In 1983, Reagan also abolished the ten federal regional councils that had been established
77.
(1971).
78.
§§ 303,
79.
§ 1512,
80.
(1977).
81.

Omnibus Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-644, § 4(2), 84 Stat. 1881, 1882
Older Americans Comprehensive Services Amendments, Pub. L. No. 93-29,
304, 87 Stat. 30, 37-41 (1973).
National Health Planning & Resources Development Act, Pub. L. No. 93-641,
88 Stat. 2225, 2232-35 (1975).
Clean Air Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 103, 91 Stat. 685, 687-688
U.S.

ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL

NONMETROPOLITAN REGIONAL COUNCILS IN THE

1990's: AN

RELATIONS, METROPOLITAN AND
UPDATE

(forthcoming 1994).

82. Bruce McDowell, Regional Organizations Hang On, INTERGOVERNMENTAL

PERSP.,

Winter 1983, at 15.
83. Intergovernmental Cooperation Act, Pub. L. No. 90-577, 82 Stat. 1098 (1968)
(codified at 31 U.S.C. § 6501-08 and 40 U.S.C. § 531-35 (1988)).
84. TIMOTHY CONLAN, NEW FEDERALISM: INTERGOVERNMENTAL REFORM FROM NIXON
TO REAGAN 211 (1988).
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by President Richard M. Nixon in 1969.85
In addition, the regional councils in the states experienced a
decline in federal financial support during the 1980s. In 1979,
there were about forty-eight federally funded planning programs
that helped to support regional councils by giving them preference as eligible funding recipients, requiring local governments
to have a regional planning agency in order to receive funds, or
requiring the existence of a regional plan. By 1991, only thirteen
of these programs remained both funded and targeted toward
regional councils. There are, however, still some thirty-six federal planning grants for which regional councils are eligible, although they are merely one of several types of eligible recipients.
In 1979, there were only three such grant programs. In addition,
federal service-delivery grants for which regional councils are eligible increased from twenty-one in 1979 to thirty-seven in
1991.6 Thus, while regional councils remain eligible for at least
eighty-six of the federal government's 557 funded grant programs, they enjoy preferred recipient status in only thirteen programs. Otherwise, regional councils must compete for federal
funds on an equal footing with many other service-delivery aspirants. Consequently, the federal fiscal share of regional-council
budgets fell from seventy-six percent in 1977 to forty-five percent in 1988, and the average staff size of regional councils
dropped from twenty-one persons in 1977 to seventeen in 1988.7
In turn, the number of councils decreased from 632 in 1980 to
529 in 1991.88
Although Reagan's opposition to regional entities was an
important factor in reducing federal support during the 1980s,
regional councils also lost federal funds because of the general
shift of federal intergovernmental aid from places to persons-a
shift that began in 1978.9 That is, federal aid to state and local
governments dedicated for payments to individuals increased
from 31.8% of all federal grants-in-aid in 1978 to 55.2% in 1989

85. Id. at 210.
86. U.S. ADVISORY

COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, METROPOLITAN AND
NONMETROPOLITAN REGIONAL COUNCILS IN THE 1990's: AN UPDATE, supra note 81.

87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Kincaid, Housing, Fragmentationand Preemption, supra note 6, at 418-19.
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and then to about 61.7% by 1992.90 Given that states administer
most of the federal-aid programs targeted for persons (e.g., Aid
to Families with Dependent Children and Medicaid), regional
councils were not the only fiscal losers. Federal aid to local governments declined sharply as well. Neither regional councils nor
local governments are likely to receive substantial infusions of
federal funds for the foreseeable future because: (1) federal aid
to state and local governments is increasingly driven and dominated by aid-to-persons entitlement programs; (2) persistent
federal deficits are further crowding out federal aid to places;
and (3) suburban voters now dominate the electorate.
Nevertheless, regional councils appear to have established
themselves as enduring entities. Councils continue to operate in
forty-seven states, and thirty states have regional councils covering their entire territory.9 1 In addition, President George Bush
did support a new regional initiative in 1990: the creation of rural development councils in eight states.9 2 In 1991, twenty-three
states appropriated $20.5 million for regional councils (compared to twenty-seven states that appropriated $12.4 million in
1978). 91 On average in 1988, regional councils received forty-five
percent of their funding from the federal government, nineteen
percent from their state government, and thirty-six percent from
local governments (compared to seventy-six percent federal, ten
percent state, and twelve percent local in 1977).
For the most part, however, regional councils, somewhat like
BRCs, have become information and service providers - a
change due, in part, to the growing dependence of councils on
local funding. As such, most regional councils have become governmental entrepreneurs, ' providing information and services

90. U.S.

ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,

TURES OF FISCAL FEDERALISM

91. U.S.

IT

SIGNIFICANT FEA-

60 (1993).

ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, METROPOLITAN AND

NONMETROPOLITAN REGIONAL COUNCILS IN THE 1990'S: AN UPDATE, supra note

81.

92. Beryl A. Radin, Rural Development Councils: An Intergovernmental Coordination Experiment, 22 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 111 (1992).
93. U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, METROPOLITAN AND
NONMETROPOLITAN REGIONAL COUNCILS IN THE 1990's: AN UPDATE, supra note 81. Some

states provide general and contract funds.
94. Robert W. Gage, Regional Councils of Governments at the Crossroads:Implications for Intergovernmental Management and Networks, 11 INT'L J. PUB. ADMIN. 467

(1988).
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on such matters as local government payroll management, landfills, police firing ranges, fingerprint and ID systems, street
maintenance, purchase and operation of snow-removal equipment, counseling services, and emergency communications. 5
Otherwise, citizens and local government officials have been
averse to investing regional councils with any significant
authority.
V.

Some Lessons of History

Despite more than a half century of efforts to create metropolitan governments, voters have not been enthusiastic. Voters
will often support the creation of specific metropolitan service
entities, particularly special districts, but rarely support consolidation to create general-purpose metropolitan government or
multi-purpose regional bodies. Where state law permits local
residents to vote on such matters, citizens are not likely to relinquish those voting rights. Where state law permits unilateral
municipal annexation of unincorporated areas, residents often
engage in defensive incorporation to block annexation. As a result, gun-shy legislatures are very reluctant to impose their will
on the local government organizational preferences of their citizens. Most local government officials also tend to oppose jurisdictional mergers, not only city-suburb consolidations but also
suburb-suburb consolidations. Although the federal government
mounted significant efforts from the 1950s to the 1980s to promote regional and metropolitan governance, primarily through
financial incentives, those efforts were curtailed during the 1980s
not only because of opposition from President Reagan but also
because of the substantial shift of federal aid from places to persons and because of rising budget deficits.
Consequently, advocates of metropolitan government or
areawide land-use management will need to find new tools.
Given that the carrots of federal and state financial incentives
are likely to be in short supply, the most available tools will be
the sticks of federal and state regulation. What Professor Mark
I. Gelfand concluded in a recent case study of Boston is indica-

95. U.S.

ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL

NONMETROPOLITAN REGIONAL COUNCILS IN THE

1990's:

RELATIONS, METROPOLITAN AND

AN UPDATE,

supra note 81.
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tive of the metropolitan reform movement's turn toward intergovernmental regulation: "Metropolitan government for Boston
in the absence of an absolute federal mandate is not likely during the foreseeable future, but federal planning regulations
might act as the catalyst to bring the region's development
under areawide control."96
The election of President Bill Clinton has given advocates
of metropolitan government new encouragement after twelve
years of hostility to regionalism from Presidents Reagan and
Bush: "if Clinton and Gore are really serious about reinventing
government, there is a genuinely revolutionary idea they might
try: abolish the suburbs. '9 7 David Rusk, former mayor of Albuquerque, New Mexico, has proposed an ambitious "new regionalism" campaign to (1) allow municipalities to override voter objections to annexation by municipalities, especially by central
cities; (2) encourage state legislatures to mandate city-county
consolidations; (3) raise requirements for municipal incorporation; (4) establish zones around existing municipalities within
which they could veto municipal incorporation; (5) invest county
governments with full municipal powers; and (6) require tax
sharing and "fair share" low-income housing arrangements
among all local governments in metropolitan areas.9 8 Advocates
of regional councils also see in the new presidential administration opportunities to revive councils and invest them with authoritative planning and regulatory powers that would allow
them to play a more directive rather than merely participative
or supportive role in metropolitan governance. 99 The National
Association of Regional Councils is encouraging role redefinition

96. MARK I. GELFAND, Development Policy in Boston, in METROPOLITAN GOVERNsupra note 58, at 13, 49.
97. Mickey Kaus, City Limits, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 3, 1993, at 6; see also, Allan
D. Wallis, New Life for Regionalism? Maybe. 81 NAT'L CIVI REV. 19 (1992).
98. RUSK, supra note 3, at 123-24. One indicator of possible voter reaction to such
proposals is reflected in the results of a national public opinion poll which asked, among
other things, whether the federal government or local governments should regulate the
location and building of low-income housing in communities. Some 20.4 percent of the
respondents chose the federal government, while 72.2 percent picked local government.
U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, FEDERAL STATUTORY PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITY: HISTORY, INVENTORY, AND ISSUES 39 (1992).
99. Robert W. Gage, Leadership and Regional Councils: A Mismatch Between
Leadership Styles Today and Future Roles, 25 STATE & Loc. GOv'T REV. 9 (1993).
ANCE,

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol13/iss2/7

26

1993]

LAND USE SYMPOSIUM

and considering establishing a National Institute of Regional
Studies. Such a role change could be effected by federal mandates and by conditions attached to federal grants-in-aid to
state and local governments. The two most rcent federal enactments seen as being supportive of a new regionalism are the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 '100 and the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991,101 both of
which established new metropolitan planning requirements.
The impact of the Clean Air Amendments is mostly regulatory because little money has been provided for Air Pollution
Control Assistance grants. ISTEA, however, gives metropolitan
planning organizations significant authority to plan and allocate
billions of federal highway and transit dollars. Nevertheless, the
Clean Air Amendments may have the most transformative effects on county, municipal, school, and special-district governments because the regulatory regime required to meet air-quality standards in some metropolitan areas may suck up key
powers of local governments over population growth (e.g., housing and schools), economic development (e.g., infrastructure),
land use (e.g., zoning), and other matters. In short, the new regionalism being proposed for the 1990s is primarily a regulatory
regionalism that would rely greatly on intergovernmental mandates to establish regional institutions and achieve regional
objectives that might otherwise be rejected by voters and by local elected officials. This approach, therefore, raises critical
questions about long-run political feasibility and democracy.
Unlike the successful progressive reform tradition associated with the internal restructuring of municipal government,
which generally sought to empower voters against political
bosses and machines, the reform tradition associated with the
external restructuring of municipal boundaries and service areas
has generally emphasized the bypassing of voters. Whereas advocates of internal municipal reform saw a vigorous and educated electorate as the key to success, advocates of external municipal reform have tended to see voters as obstacles to success.
Advocates of regionalism, therefore, have encouraged voter dis-

100. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990).
101. Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-240,
105 Stat. 1914 (1991).
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enfranchisement in three respects: (1) by relying on federal and
state legislation to establish regional entities and to impose regional rules on local governments; (2) by establishing regional
bodies that are not elected by the voters; and (3) by using regional rules and bodies to implement policies likely to be rejected by voters. Of course, advocates of regionalism have been
driven in a regulatory direction precisely because voters have
been hostile to authoritative and consolidationist regional arrangements. Nevertheless, voters have spoken rather clearly and
consistently on matters of metropolitan regionalism in the twentieth century, and the requisites of democracy require some deference to their preferences.
Consequently, efforts to use regulatory tools to achieve regional objectives may be construed by voters as attempts to
hammer them into submission to "big government." A California
county supervisor termed this approach "an attempt to impose
unelected master governments on elected local governments." In
an era when many citizens already believe that government is
too big, remote, and beyond their control, voters are likely to
cling to their local self-governance prerogatives. This fact may
be all the more salient today because the United States is now a
suburban nation, with most citizens living in small and mediumsize communities. This development may also make it more difficult to enact regulatory regionalism to achieve land-use and
growth-management policies because gubernatorial, state legislative, congressional, and presidential elections are increasingly
shaped by suburban interests. Although these interests are quite
diverse and far from monolithic or simply Republican on most
issues, they are likely to cohere on questions of community control and local self-government. As a result, supporters of regionalism may need to turn more to the courts for relief from voter
resistance.
.The implementation of land-use and growth-management
policies through regulatory regionalism faces additional obstacles because of the historically close identification of land use
with local government prerogatives and private property rights.
Current experiences with state growth-management legislation
suggest that local control is a potent factor in shaping land-use
law. State legislatures have been reluctant to enact stringent
rules that centralize authority in state agencies or regional bod-
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ies. °2 As a general rule, it appears to be the case that the weaker
the regulation and the greater the role of local government, the
greater the feasibility of enacting statewide and regional growthmanagement legislation. Furthermore, in an era of local fiscal
constraint and increased federal and state mandating with little
or no intergovernmental revenue support, regulatory regionalism
is vulnerable to local government and taxpayer revolts. For example, Florida's Local Government Comprehensive Planning
and Land Development Regulation Act of 1985 was a key factor
in local government and voter support for Proposition Three in
November 1990, which amended the Florida Constitution so as
to limit the ability of the state legislature to enact unfunded
mandates on local governments." 3 Eleven states now have a constitutional provision limiting unfunded mandates, while six
others have a statutory provision. 04
Supporters of regional efforts to override metropolitan
"fragmentation" and voter antipathy also tend to look abroad to
more centralized political systems for models of regionalism
while overlooking other federal systems, such as Switzerland, a
sister republic with historically close ties to the United States
and many similar political values.10 5 If "fragmentation" and
voter sovereignty have the deleterious consequences often attributed to them in the United States, then Switzerland should be a
balkanized basket case. Swiss voters have a much larger voice in
all matters-local, cantonal, and confederal-than do American
voters.106 Furthermore, tiny Switzerland has 6,873,687 citizens
living in twenty-six cantons, the smallest (Appenzell Innerrhoden) having 13,870 inhabitants and the largest (Zurich) having 1,179,044 inhabitants. In addition, there are some 3,000 gen-
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eral-purpose local governments. Like American voters, Swiss
voters usually reject proposals to consolidate local governments.
However, Swiss voters, also like Americans, support many more
special-district governments that perform regional functions.
The canton of Thurgau, for example, has several hundred overlapping functional jurisdictions with corresponding revenue-raising powers. 107 In the case of minuscule Appenzell Innerrhoden,
which cannot self-finance a state university, large hospital, and
other major services, the canton enters agreements with neigh10 8
boring St. Gallen to provide such services.
Finally, despite the large literature that has developed on
statewide and regional land-use and growth-management legislation, there are few systematic, empirical evaluations of the costs
and benefits of such laws. Neither proponents 0" nor opponents1 are able to offer much solid evidence in support of their
contentions. In part, the paucity of empirical evidence is due to
the normative difficulty of stipulating and then measuring costs
and benefits. Land-use and growth-management decisions are
preeminently value choices that deeply affect public interests
and private rights. Consequently, voter resistance and reform
persistence on questions of metropolitan regionalism produce
contentious and controversial political battles that cannot be
settled easily by rational fact-based discourse.
Given the prevalence of zoning ordinances, however, there is
no evidence that voters are inherently hostile to land-use regulation or growth management. Public support for a laissez-faire
approach to land use seems virtually non-existent. At the same
time, twentieth-century history clearly indicates that voters
value local control and resist regulatory metropolitan regionalism. Supporters of statewide and regional land-use regulation
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and growth management, therefore, will need to assure voters
that they will have a voice in policymaking and that decisionmaking institutions will be ultimately accountable to local voters, not to a state bureaucracy established by the legislature
and/or a federal bureaucracy established by the Congress.
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